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admiralty jurisdiction with the already united law and equity jurisdictions.'
The merger would wipe out unrealistic technical distinctions now attendant
on the divided jurisdictions. Civil and "admiralty" claims arising out of the
same operative facts must now be brought in separate actions.121 Two appeals
are necessary. 122 Mistakes in determining the side of the court on which to
bring the claim are possible.323 Filing on the wrong side means transfer 124 or
dismissal..2 5 In either case the litigant suffers delay.
Experience with remodeling of law and equity has demonstrated that amalga-
mation of dual procedural systems to give one federal procedure is not difficult.
Unification of admiralty with law-equity involves only the problem of preserv-
ing to admiralty and civil litigants their substantive rights. 12 The Supreme
Court should appoint a comniittee similar to that which successfully combined
law and equity to effect a further merger with admiralty. With the assistance
and cooperation of the admiralty bar, revision should be accomplished without
undue delay.
120. "[U]nder its present rule making power [the Supreme Court could weld] the
admiralty and the united law and equity jurisdictions together under the civil procedure
of the Federal Rules with such additions for special matters as may be appropriate."
5 MOORE. FEDERAL PRACTICE 69-70 (1951).
121. E.g., The Eclipse, 135 U.S. 608 (1889). See 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 285
(1951).
122. Ibid.
123. Although the admiralty court may enforce a "subsidiary" legal or equitable
claim, see Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950)
(where the court had jurisdiction over libellant's "subsidiary" claim that property
attached by him had been fraudulenlty transferred by one respondent to the other respon-
dent), the admiralty court may not enforce an "independent" legal or equitable claim,
See e.g., The Eclipse, 135 U.S. 608 (1889) and cases there cited. The distinction be-
tween a "subsidiary" and an "independent" claim is often unclear. The Supreme Court
decision in Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, suepra, overruled
the two lower courts which had held that admiralty had no jurisdiction over the claim of
fraudulent transfer.
124. E.g., The John R. Williams, 144 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub noam,
Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. United States, 323 US. 782 (1944) (transfer
from admiralty docket to civil docket) ; Jordine v. Walling, 185 F2d 662, 671 (3d Cir.
1950). See Petrol Corp. v. Petroleum Heat and Power Co., 162 F.2d 327, 333 (2d Cir.
1947) where it is said that transfer from the civil docket to the admiralty docket would
be available in a proper case.
125. The Ealipse, 135 U.S. 599 (1890).
126. 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 70 (1951).
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PROXY SOLICITATION COSTS AND
CORPORATE CONTROL*
PRoxY voting, intended to facilitate stockholder participation in corporate
decisions,1 has stymnied stockholder control in publicly-held corporations.2
Stockholders who disapprove of managerial policy or action face far greater
difficulty in securing supporting proxies than does management.3 The incum-
bents not only can ride on the need for corporate stability and on stocIdiolders'
inertia,4 but also have easier access to the stockholder list? Moreover, man-
*Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
1. Common law did not recognize a right to vote by proxy, in the absence of special
authorization in the corporate charter. 5 FLTCrcHERE, CYCLOPEOLI Co=,n1%TioNs, § 2050
(pert. ed. 1931); Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MiciH. L. P. 33-40 (1942). But im-
practicability of personal attendance at stockholders' meetings, resulting from ownership
increasingly dispersed among investors with stakes in many enterprises, forced general
acceptance of proxy voting. See id. at 42-6; Bernstein & Fischer, The Regulation
of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflectlions on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. 02
Cur. L. REv. 226-7 (1940). It is now expressly sanctioned in all states except Iowa and
Texas, which, in practice, permit it. Dean, Non-Compliance aith Proxy Regulations,
24 CORNELL L.Q. 483, 488 (1939).
2. See BEmIT & MEANS, THE MODRN. Co~aoax.rloN AND PrvAE' Prorznrv 86-9,
138-9 (1932); Dns-ocic & HYD, BtJREAucnAc- %ND TRusTEsnir rz Ltn. Cow.nA-
Tioxs 19-21 (TNEC Monograph 11, 1940); Blair, Appraising the Board of Directors,
28 H~Av. Bus. REv. No. 1, pp. 101, 102 (1950). Cf. BURNxH.%, ThE MANAGUAL, RVo-
LunoN (1941). The proxy solicitation process has in effect supplanted the stockholders'
meeting. Bernstein & Fischer, supra note 1, at 227; Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings
and Corporate Democracy: The Lawycr's Role, 37 VA. L. REv. 653, 655 (1951). And
since solicitation is ordinarily conducted only by management, stockholders are pre-
sented a choice between voting for management or not voting at all. RgM.-ror Ot Tnz
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE STUDY AiNZD IVESTIGATIO: OF TUC-
WoRK, AcnrvrrTxs, PERSONNEL AND FuNcrioNs oF PaorncrrE Commrms, PArT VII
MANAGEMENT PLANS wrrHouT Am OF CouirrrEEs 130 (1938) (hereinafter cited as
SEC REPORT VII); Dean, supra note 1, at 493; Note, 53 HMg. - REv. 1165, 1163
(1940).
The resulting separation of ownership from control of corporate affairs has encour-
aged incompetence, negligence and corruption in management. Hearings before Sub-
committee of the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 35,60, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 53,
203 (1940); SEN. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 11 (1940) ; Hornstein, Legal Con-
trols for Intracorporate Abuse-Present and Future, 41 CO. L REv. 405, 443 (1941). For
a classification of the types of intracorporate abuse, see id. at 406-7.
3. See Loss, SEcurunis REGULATION 522 (1951); Comment, 33 It.. L. REv. 914,
917 (1939); Note, 53 HAnv. L. REv. 1165, 1168 (1940). State statutes commonly
require little or no advance notice to stockholders of management proposals presented
at corporate meetings. See, e.g., N. Y. SToCN Cox. L.,AW § 45, D,. Conp. L-,w § 30.
See also Dean, supra note 1, at 490. Consequently, stockholders may not learn of objec-
tionable plans in time to contest them effectively.
4. STEVxNs, ComoarioNs § 123 (2d ed. 1949); DmzocK AND Hkn, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 19-21; Note, 36 Comz . L. Q. 558, 559 (1951).
5. Stockholders have a right to examine the stockholder list for proper purpo-es.
P-H Corp. Stav. I3404 (1947). The right cannot be taken avway by charter or by-lax.
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agement can draw on the corporate treasury for all reasonable solicitation
expenses, at least in proxy contests involving policy issues.0 In no reported
case has management had to pay its own way in a proxy fight.' Dissenting
stockholders, on the other hand, have traditionally defrayed all solicitation
expenses out of their own pockets.8 Thus the proxy machinery has operated as
a cost-free "self-perpetuation and self-approval device"9 for management.
The Securities and Exchange Commission's proxy rules have laid the
groundwork for effective stockholder participation."0 In proxy solicitations
State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 4 Del. 81, 143 Atl. 257 (Ct. in Banc 1926)
cf. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 355 (Deering 1941). And solicitation of other stockholders'
proxies for use in an election is a proper purpose. Klein v. Scranton Life Insurance Co.,
139 Pa. Super. 369, 11 A.2d 770 (1940); Insuranshares Corp. of Del. v. Kirchner,
40 Del. 105, 5 A.2d 519 (Sup. Ct. 1939). But management has physical possession of
the stockholder list, and litigation may be necessary to enforce the right to examination.
Note, 53 HAav. L. REV. 1165, 1168 n.22 (1940); see, e.g., Application of Joslyn, 191
Misc. 512, 78 N.Y.S.2d 183 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
6. The leading American case is Hall v. Translux Daylight Picture Screen Corp.,
20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 Atl. 226 (Ch. 1934), following Peel v. London & N.W. Ry. Co.
[1907] 1 Ch. Div. 5 (1906). Accord: McGoldrick v. Segal, 124 N.Y.L.J. 461, col. 2 (Sup.
Ct. Sept. 14, 1950); Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649 (D.Del.
1944); see Empire Southern Gas Co. v. Gray, 46 A.2d 741, 744 (Del. Ch. 1946)
(management has "duty to solicit" in policy controversies). Limited proxy solicitation
at corporate expense, incident to mailing notices of meeting, seems permissible whether
or not an issue of policy is involved. Bounds v. Stephenson, 187 S.W. 1031 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1916) (expenditures for management proxy, blank proxy and stamped
envelope enclosed with notice held proper without reference to issues involved); ci.
Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. L. & R. Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 399, 80
N.E. 199, 201 (1907) (no policy issue; dictum that custom of distributing proxy forms
at slight expense with directions for return is "not without merit"). Where nothing
more is at stake than the membership of the board of directors, however, the co:ats
of extensive solicitation may not be charged to the corporation. Lawyers' Advertising
Co. v. Consolidated Ry. L. & R. Co., mpra (follow-up newspaper advertisements held
improper); Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Walker, 92 PinTs. LEG. J. 464 (C.P. Alleghany
County 1944) (professional proxy solicitors). Contra: In re Zickl, 73 N.Y.S.2d 181
(Sup. Ct. 1947) (employment of professional proxy solicitors sustained without refer-
ence to issues involved).
7. But cf. Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Walker, 92 Prrs. LEm. J. 464 (C.P. Alleghany
County 1944) (court refuses to dismiss where professional proxy solicitors were paid
from corporate funds in personnel contest). Compare Lawyers' Advertising Co. v.
Consolidated Ry. L. & R. Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907) (advertising agency
denied recovery against corporation for cost of newspaper solicitation whicl "was not
and could not have been lawfully" authorized in personnel contest). Under the cir-
cumstances, recovery from directors personally may have followed.
8. See Baium & MEA s, op. cit. supra note 2, at 82-3; Loss, SEcuRrrlEs REGULATION4
522 (1951) ; Caplin, supra note 2, at 682.
9. Bernstein & Fischer, supra note 1, at 227.
10. Regulation X-14 (Rules X-14A-1 through X-14A-9 and Schedule 14A), 17
CoDE FED. REcs. §§ 240.14a-1-240.14a-9 (1949), promulgated under § 14a of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881, 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1946).
This section makes it "unlawful for any person by the use of the mails or by any means
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over which it has authority," the SEC requires full disclosure of the sub-
stance of each proposal on which the proxy is to be voted' and other pertinent
information.'2 The proxy form must also permit the stockholder to vote for
or against each proposal.' 4 Moreover, management must mail dissenters'
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of any national securities
exchange or otherwise to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any pro.-y
or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security)
registered on any national securities exchange in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors." For excellent analyses of the proxy rules, see Loss,
SEC URITIEs RouLx io.T 521-60 (1951) ; Emerson & Latcham, SEC Proxy Regulation:
Steps Toward More Effecth'e Stockholder Participation, 59 Y=u L.J. 635 (1950);
Friedman, SEC Regulation of Corporate Proxies, 63 I-nv. L. R,. 796 (1950). The
rules' main thrust has been toward assuring stockholders the full information necessary
for intelligent participation in corporate affairs. Loss, supra at 525; CQmment, 33 IL.
L. REv. 914, 915 (1939).
11. § 14a of the Securities Exchange Act gives the Commission rule-maling power
only over proxy solicitation in connection with securities listed on national exchanges.
Other legislation extends the SEC's authority to the unlisted securities of public-utility
holding companies and their subsidiaries, and registered investment companies. Public
Utility Holding Co. Act, § 12(e), 49 STAT. 803, 824 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 791(e) (1946);
Investment Company Act, §20(a), 54.STAT. 7S9, 822 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §90a-20(a)
(1946). But the voting securities of numerous large publicly-held corporations, e.g.,
Aluminum Co. of America, remain outside the range of SEC regulation. See SEC
Susp. REP. To COxGREss, A PRoPos.%L To SA~FEGLtD I.VESTORS nz U:.rX.,lSTV1ED
SEcuRErrEs, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (Sen. Banking and Currency Comm. Print 1950).
12. The proxy form itself must "identify clearly and impartially each matter or
group of related matters intended to be acted upon, whether proposed by the manage-
ment or by security holders". Rule X-14A-4(a) (2). And the proxy statement required
to accompany or precede the proxy form must describe such matters in substantial
detail. See Schedule 14A, Items 8-21.
13. The proxy form must "indicate in bold face type whether or not the proxy is
solicited on behalf of the management." Rule X-14A-4(a) (1). And the proxy state-
ment must include information on (1) the revocability of prodies; (2) appraisal rights;
(3) whom the solicitation is to benefit, and at whose expense; (4) the solicitors' "sub-
stantial interest," if any, in the outcome; (5) the voting securities and their principal
holders; (6) the backgrounds of director-candidates; and (71, under some circum-
stances, the compensation of top management. Schedule 14A, Items 1-7.
14. Rule X-14A-4(b). This does not apply to managements candidates for election
as directors.
The proxy holder may not be effectively bound to vote adverse proxies. See Dean,
supra note 1, at 4934; 64 HARv. L. Rnv. 6683, 669 (1951). Proxies are technically treated
by courts as creating a form of agency relationship, revocable at will unless "coupled
with an interest". Duffy v Loft, Inc., 17 Del. Ch. 140, 151 At. 223 (Ch. 1930); cf.
Rudolph v. Murphy, 121 Neb. 612, 237 NXV. 659 (1931). For various theories on which
damage liability for failure to vote proxies might be based, see Comment, 33 ILL. L, REv.
914, 928-9 (1939). And solicitation may amount to a representation that proxies will be
voted as marked, on the basis of which timely action to compel voting them %ill lie.
Cf. Lizars v. Dahlberg, Docket 1944, Folio 264, Superior Ct. of Baltimore City, May 22,
1944. The SEC now seeks to enforce voting of proxies by requiring the proxy materials
to state that they will be voted as marked. Rule X-14A-4(e). Failure so to vote them
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proxy materials for them, if it does not surrender the stockholder l1st, 5 and
must include certain stockholder proposals in its own proxy materials.10
While these rules encourage formation and expression of stockholder opinion,17
they do little to endanger management's tenure.18 A real possibility of
replacing the board of directors 9 is necessary to assure an able management
would presumably make this statement materially false or misleading and might lead to
damages, injunction, or criminal penalties for violation of the fraud rule, X-14A-9. But
damages resulting from non-voting are difficult to prove; injunctions must be sought
before the meeting; and violation of the SEC rule must be "willful" to incur criminal
sanctions.
15. Rule X-14A-7. Mailing is at the stockholder's expense.
16. Rule X-14A-8. The proposal must be "a proper subject for action by the security
holders." As to what constitutes such a subject, see SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163
F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948), Note, 57 YALu L.J. 874
(1948); Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). If management
opposes the proposal, the stockholder must be permitted to include a statement of not
more than 100 words in its support. However, the shareholder must have an affirmative
proposal; he.cannot simply state his opposition to management plans. And stockholders
may not thus propose an opposition slate of candidates for election to office. For a
blow-by-blow account of an economical proxy fight in which the insurgents took full ad-
vantage of this and other proxy rules, see Emerson & Latcham, Further Insight into More
Effective Stockholder Participation: The Sparks-Withington Proxy Contest, 60 YALE
L.J. 429 (1951).
17. The disclosure and ballot requirements afford substantial basis for informed stock-
holder action upon specific management or stockholder proposals for the future. As to
management's record of past performance, however, disclosure is less complete: manage-
ment is simply required to submit an annual report of operations, if it solicits proxies in
connection with an election meeting. Rule X-14A-3 (b).
18. The Commission, and perhaps the stockholder as well, has broad powers to
prevent and undo violation of the proxy rules. Loss, SEculuTIEs REGULATION 543-52
(1951) ; Friedman, supra note 10, at 808-14. The rules may often be avoided, however,
by the simple expedient of soliciting proxies only from "cooperating" stockholders, or
not soliciting proxies at all. Management may control a quorum without need to solicit
where statutes permit minimal quorum requirements. See, e.g., OHIo GEN. CoDE
§ 8623-48 (Page 1949). Or, lacking control of a quorum, it may fail to solicit and con-
tinue in office by default of a quorum at the meeting. Crown Plumbing Supply Co, v.
Mishkin, 119 N.Y.L.J. 1909, Col. 7 (Sup. Ct. May 21, 1948). See Gilbert, Managemennt
and the Public Stockholder, 28 HARv. Bus. Rxv., No. 4, pp. 73, 79 (1950). A number of
corporations appear to have thus evaded the disclosure requirements of the proxy rules.
Dean, supra note 1, at 487; Bernstein & Fisher, supra note 1, at 242.
19. In corporations which elect only a fraction of the board at any one meeting,
insurgents cannot win control in a single campaign.
One commentator has suggested that stockholders' power to control their corpora-
tion can be largely restored by extension of Rule X-14A-8, supra note 16, to permit
nomination of and voting for an opposition slate in management's proxy materials. Caplin,
supra note 2, at 679-86. Such an extension of the Rule was at one time considered by
the Commission. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Comnerce
on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 and H.R. 2019, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-5 (1943). For the
objections of business, see id., at 197. This would permit challenging the incumbents at
slight expense to the corporation. But establishment of "an effective right of recall"
by this means seems unlikely. Aside from the limited range of SEC proxy authority,
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attentive to stockholder interests. 20 Yet the obstacles to a proxy contest-par-
ticularly the cost of solicitation-make such a possibility slim.
2 1
The recent decision in Steinberg v. Adams22 takes a long step toward
eliminating the cost burden on dissenters. At the 1947 annual meeting of
the Thompson-Starrett Co., dissident stockholders unseated management
which had spent $20,000 of the corporation's funds soliciting proxies in its
own behalf. The new board, with subsequent stockholder approval, reim-
bursed itself from the corporate treasury for its solicitation expenditures of
$27,000.23 In a stockholder's derivative suit plaintiff claimed both sums for
supra note 11, possible refusal to vote adverse proxies, supra note 14, and possible evasion
of the proxy requirements, supra note 18, corporate management could hardly be ousted
without vigorous proxy solicitation by the opposition. See Davids v. Sillcox, 183 Misc.
45, 66 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Friedman, supra note 10, at 807.
20. Caplin, supra note 2, at 657. The disclosure requirements of the proxy rules
probably tend to curb management misconduct. Id. at 667; Hornstein, supra note ?,
at 451. But if management nevertheless ignores the stockholders' expressed views, is
neglectful or incompetent, or actively abuses its position, stockholders have no other
effective remedy than the threat of replacing the board of directors. Though Rule
X-14A-8 facilitates expression of shareholders' views, it adds nothing to their limited
power under state law directly to control corporate action. See Loss, SEcun rms
REGULATION 538-9 (1951). The stockholder's derivative suit, another check on manage-
ment, is increasingly pocked with procedural pitfalls. Cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Hornstein, The Dc'athkhzcU of Stockholdcrs" Derialik
Suits in. New York, 32 CALIF. L. RE . 123 (1944); The Future of Corporate Control, 63
HARv. L. REv. 476 (1950). See note 47 infra.
21. Proxy contests have apparently been rare. Gilbert, supra note 18, at 78. For an
excellent detailed account of one, see Emerson & Latcham, supra note 16.
Under § 12(e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 STAT. 803, 324 (1935),
15 U.S.C. § 791(e) (1946), the SEC has acted to reduce insurgents' relative cost dis-
advantages in solicitations for elections in registered holding companies and their sub-
sidiaries. Rule U-65 prohibits management expenditure of more than $1,000 of corporate
funds annually aside from "ordinary" proxy solicitation expenditures, unless the Com-
mission orders otherwise. 17 CoDE FFD. REGs. § 250.65 (1949). See Standard Gas and
Electric Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7020, Dec. 2, 1946. Cf., Pittsburgh Steel
Co. v. Walker, 92 Pirrs LEG. J. 464 (C.P. Alleghany County 1944). Xevertheless, the
absolute cost burden of an active proxy fight probably remains a substantial deterrent to
such contests. See note 23 infra.
22. 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); 36 COR.ELL LQ. 558 (1951).
23. To comply with Item 3 (d) (2) of Schedule 14A of the SEC proxy regulation,
the parties had indicated in their proxy statements that their respective expenditures
would be about $7,500 and $6,000. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Jan. 6, 1950, p. 14, Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y.
1950). Understatement is not uncommon: in the Sparks-Withington contest, manage-
ment predicted $7,500, but spent ,51,000. Emerson & Latcham, supra note 16, at 445.
Proxy solicitation costs vary widely, apparently depending upon the size of the com-
pany and the distribution of its voting stock. In the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Co.
contest in 1949, each party spent over $125,000. Caplin, supra note 2, at 663 n.30. In
contrast, the successful insurgents in the Sparks-Vithington contest apparently spent
only $6,000. Emerson & Latcham, supra note 16, at 433. Expenditures may be sub-
stantial though no contest is involved. Proxy solicitation costs for the 1947 special meeting
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the benefit of the corporation. Both parties moved for summary judgment.
They apparently agreed that the old board's expenditures were proper if an
issue of policy was involved in the contest. Plaintiffs contended, however,
that reimbursement of the insurgents was improper in any case. Going
beyond established precedent, the Court held that the successful insurgents'
right to corporate funds for proxy solicitation is as great as the incumbents'-
at least where their reimbursement is approved by both the board of directors
and a majority of the shareholders.2 4  It saw no reason to prevent repay-
ment to "those whose expenditures succeeded in ridding a corporation of a
policy frowned upon by a majority of the stockholders.1 25 But since, on the
evidence in the record, the Court could not decide beyond the "slightest
doubt" whether the contest had involved a "policy" issue, both motions for
summary judgment had to be denied.
2 6
Benefit to the corporation was the decisive principle of the Steinberg
holding.2r Surely the corporation benefits directly by informed decisions
resulting from clarification and settlement of latent issues in a contest for
control of the corporation. Moreover, this process stimulates stockholder
interest in the corporation and encourages active participation in corporate
affairs.28  Above all, the increased threat of accountability for its conduct
of the enterprise makes for more responsible management.2
In view of the corporate benefit principle, application of the Stcintrg
rule in future cases should require neither subsequent stockholder approval
of Consolidated Edison Co. Inc. of N.Y. were forecast at $50,000. Note, 21 T.MP. L.Q.
406, 411 (1948).
24. 90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
25. Id. at 607-8.
26. Id. at 608. Unwilling to furnish the security for costs required by the court under
N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §61-b, see note 47 infra, plaintiffs thereafter abandoned their
action. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Carlos J. Isracls, dated Oct. 29,
1951, on file in Yale Law Library.
27. The court found analogy in the reimbursement of the successful stockholder who
brings a derivative suit for the benefit of the corporation. 90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y.
1950). See STEVENs, CoIRoRATioxs § 174 (2d ed. 1949). For an evaluation of the deci-
sion in terms of this analogy, see Note, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 558 (1951).
28. It has been suggested that stockholders are not equipped to comprehend corporate
affairs, Note, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1172 (1940), and that, being primarily speculators,
they are not interested. But stockholder indifference may well be an effect as well as a
cause of management domination. Cf. Caplin, supra note 2, at 680-1. And shareholders
may be fully as competent as non-expert directors. Moreover, some issues of corporate
policy, e.g., management compensation and incentive schemes and pension plans, can be
intelligently passed upon without special expertise. The direct value of stockholders'
views aside, the corporation benefits indirectly by any increase in their participation:
one substantial reason for public regulation of the enterprise disappears as politically
dangerous concentration of control in management is eliminated.
29. See note 20 supra. For a narrower view of what constitutes benefit to a cor-
poration, see Note, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 558, 563-4 (1951).
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of reimbursemen 3 nor success in ousting management. The corporation
gains equally whether or not the shareholders ratify repayment.31 Since
courts have never required management to seek stockholder ratification, no
reason appears why such a burden should be placed on the opposition, 2 And
although permitting repayment only to insurgents who win control of the
corporation eliminates any necessity for affirmative judicial action, others
should not be inflexibly barred from reimbursement.33  Indeed, some or all
of the insurgents' campaign proposals may be adopted by the corporation,
though incumbent management wins the election.3 4 And the good of the
corporation may also be served by consideration of the losing slate's views,
even though they are ultimately rejected. Shareholders' dissatisfaction may
be eliminated and their interest stimulated whatever the outcome. Moreover,
restriction of reimbursement to successful dissenters would seriously limit
the prophylactic usefulness of the Stcinbcrg rule. Given management's other
proxy solicitation advantages, a possibility of cost recovery conditioned upon
success in ousting management affords little new incentive to challenge in-
cumbents.
The reasoning of the cases upholding management expenditures supports
judicial extension of the Steiizberg rule to permit reimbursement of deserving
but unsuccessful proxy contestants. 'Management is said to have a duty, or at
least a right, when challenged, to state and support its views on questions of
corporate policy, and may therefore solicit proxies at corporate expense.3 5
30. See id. at 560, n.8.
31. Moreover, shifts in stock ownership by the time of ratification might capriciously
alter the result.
32. In approving management's solicitation outlays in Peel v. London & N. N. Ry. Co.
[1907] 1 Ch. Div. 5 (1906), the court noted, id. at 7, but did not turn its decision
on, subsequent stockholder ratification. Nor did the Steinberg court deem it indispensable.
90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.1. 1950).
33. Change of management itself need not inevitably benefit the corporation. Note,
36 CORNELL L.Q. 558, 563-4 (1951). However, the benefits incident to the process of
challenging management accrue whether or not the challengers prevail.
34. Cf. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 847 (1948), Note, 57 YAE L.J. S74 (1948). A stockholder of Transamerica
submitted four proposals for shareholder action to management for inclusion in its proxy
materials pursuant to Rule X-14A-8. Management declined to include any of the
proposals, but adopted one of them. When required to include the other three proposals
in its proxy literature, management adopted two of them without putting them to a vote.
35. Peel v. London & N.W. Ry. Co. [1907] 1 CI. Div. (1906) (duty to inform
and advise gives rise to incidental right to solicit supporting proxies at corporate
expense); Empire Southern Gas Co. Y. Gray, 46 A.2d 741 (DeL Ch. 1946) (right or
duty to solicit proxies) ; Hall v. Translux: Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Cli
78, 171 Atl. 26 (Ch. 1934) (proper to inform, advise and solicit supporting proxies);
McGoldrick v. Segal, 124 N.Y.L.J. 461, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 14, 1950) (same). When
no question of corporate policy is raised, the desirability of securing a quorum justifies
limited expenditures by managemcnt. Bounds v. Stephenson, 187 S.W. 1031 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1916) (trifling expenditures permissible); cf. Lavyers' Advertising Co. v.
Consolidated Ry. L. & R. Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 399, 80 N.E. 199, 201 ,1907).
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The theory here, too, is benefit to the corporation."" Courts sustain such
expenditures on the ground that proxy solicitation promotes intelligent exer-
cise of shareholders' judgment and expression of their views.37 But clearly,
informed shareholder action cannot result from a one-sided presentation, or
no presentation at all.38 The "benefit" justification of management recourse
to corporate funds in a proxy campaign requires its extension to the unsuccess-
ful opposition in proper cases.
An elastic rule of reasonableness should determine what is a proper case
for dissenter recovery. Plainly, the rule should not give crackpots and
opportunists carte blanche to spend corporate funds in pursuit of pet projects
or personal plums.39 Courts could use the standard generally applied to
test the propriety of management solicitation expenditures: were reasonable
expenditures made in a contest involving some issue of policy ?40 But courts
recognize that no clear line separates policy issues from those merely of
personnel.41 Any candidate for corporate office can readily develop a policy
platform on which to run. The policy test should therefore be abandoned as
inadequate.42 Rather, repayment of dissenters' expenses should be restricted
36. Peel v. London & N. W. Ry. Co. [1907] 1 Ch. Div. 5 (1906); IHal v.
Translux Daylight Pictures Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 At. 226 (Ch. 1934);
cf. Rascovor v. American Linseed Co., 135 Fed. 341 (2d Cir. 1905). One writer has
suggested that management's "duty" to inform and advise the shareholders gives it a
unique right of access to the corporate treasury to pay proxy solicitation costs, Note,
36 CORNELL L.Q. 558, 564 (1951). However, courts do not always justify solicitation
expenditures in terms of management's "duty." See note 35 supra. But in any case,
management's duty is predicated on the assumption that it is acting for the benefit of
the corporation. And stockholders' identical activities might be of equal benefit.
37. Hall v. Translux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 Atl. 226
(Ch. 1934) ; McGoldrick v. Segal, 124 N.Y.L.J. 461, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 14, 1950)
Peel v. London & N. W. Ry. Co. [1907] 1 Ch. Div. 5 (1906).
38. In connection with recapitalization plans, for example, the SEC noted in 1938
that "with but infrequent exceptions the management fails to present the arguments
which could be raised against the plan." SEC REPORT VII at 116.
39. The danger of abuse is easily exaggerated. It was thought that SEC proxy
rule X-14A-8, obliging management to include stockholder proposals with support-
ing 100-word statements in its proxy materials, "would open the door wide to
libelous, malicious, scurrilous, or abusive matter supplied by notoriety-seeking per-
sons. . . ." Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Cofmmerce oil
H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 and H.R. 2019, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1943). Yet in the
years 1945 through 1949, less than 2% of the proxy statements filed by management
with the SEC contained any stockholder proposals. 16 SEC ANN. Re. 42 (1951).
40. See note 6 supra.
41. Hall v. Translux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 85, 171 At!.
226, 229 (Ch. 1934) ("It is impossible in many cases of intracorporate contests over
directors, to sever questions of policy from those of persons ... .") ; Steinberg v. Adams,
90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ("generally policy and personnel do not exist
in separate compartments"); McGoldrick v. Segal, 124 N.Y.L.J. 461, col, 2 (Sup, Ct.
Sept. 14, 1950).
42. The policy test does not seem to add anything to the reasonableness test other
than a delusive suggestion of clarity. See Comment, 49 MIcH. L. RFv. 605 (1951) passhn.
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to proxy fights where issues are reasonably related to corporate welfare.40
And reasonableness should depend on not only the issues involved, but the
insurgents' good faith, the strength of shareholder support enlisted, and the
type and amount of expenditure.44 With the sanction of such case-by-case
determination, stockholders will be discouraged from extravagant and capri-
cious campaigning. An outright reasonableness test, therefore, is a more
valid measure than the "policy-reasonable cost" standard and can effectively
control solicitation expenditures.
Two methods are available for judicial enforcement of losing dissenters'
reimbursement claims. In a direct suit by the losers against the corporation
payment might be ordered.45 Or courts could indirectly enforce payment by
enlarging management's derivative suit liability. Thus they could hold
management's outlay unreasonable and compel restitution to the corporate
treasury unless the losers' reasonable claims were honored by management,
43. Cf. Hall v. Translux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 7, 171 Adt.
226 (Ch. 1934) (merger and stock dividend); Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co.,
54 F. Supp. 649 (D.Del. 1944) (plan for liquidation); Empire Southern Gas Co. v.
Gray, 46 A.2d 741 (Del. Ch. 1946) (merger or maintaining costly suite of offices);
Peel v. London & NA.. Ry. Co., [19071 1 Ch. Div. 5 (190G) (conference on inter-
railway cooperation, use of larger railway cars, and more elaborate statistical system).
See also Emerson & Latcham, supra note 16 (management's record of neglect and poor
performance). Two types of issue which may be involved in an election contest can be
distinguished: the directors may be challenged because they stand for particular policies
whose desirability for the future is questioned, or because they stand for a record of
performance whose promise for the future is doubted. Issues of the latter type, though
difficult to cast into the mold of a "policy" formula, would seem at least equal to the
former in potential importance to corporate welfare.
44. No court has yet held any expenditures improper in a "policy" contest. When
courts are convinced that nothing more is involved than the spoils of corporate office,
however, their scrutiny becomes closer. In such cases, the tendency has been to limit
expenditures of corporate funds by declaring improper the means of solicitation principally
employed. Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Walker, 92 Prrrs. Lna. J. 464 (C.P. Alleghany
County 1944) (employment of professional proxy solicitors) ; Lavyers' Advertising Co.
%% Consolidated Ry. L. & R. Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907) (newspaper adver-
tisements); but cf., In re Zickl, 73 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (employment of
professional proxy solicitors held "entirely proper" without discussion of nature of
issues). Use of professional proxy solicitors is apparently standard practice today.
See Regulation X-14, Schedule 14A, Item 3.
45. Cost reimbursement of successful plaintiffs in derivative suits may afford useful
precedent. Cf. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Cannon v.
Parker, 151 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1945). See Note, 36 CoRn'aL L.Q. 558 (1951). In
such cases; no separate suit for cost recovery need Le brought, however. The award is
usually made as a part of the adjudication in which the claim to it arises. But see
N.Y. GEx. CoRp. LAW § 65 (permitting separate suit). Moreover, it is usually made "out
of" the particular fund or property which is the subject of the original suit. Alternatively,
losing dissenters might seek to recover at law in quasi-contract. See DAwso:;, U:jus1T
E-MUCMMENr 113 (1951): "[T]here is nothing in our prestnt conceptions that prev, at;
an appropriate unjust enrichment remedy from being used in any field."
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